Monday, March 25, 2013

Quasi-Government Function -- Really? Why?

A recent piece in the Wall Street Journal addressing the distinction in tax consequences between tax credits and charitable deductions in tax reform initiatives got me thinking about the whole nature and logic of civil society.  According to the writer, distinguishing between proposed limitations on deductions and the charitable-deduction is important because expenditures controlled by the government clearly benefit all taxpayers by supporting the "quasi-government function" performed by legitimate charities and educational institutions.

What is going on in this discussion, and in a press conference held by House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, is that all tax cuts, all exemptions from taxable income, and deductions authorized for business and charitable purposes are in fact government expenditures.  As Pelosi sees it, these are involve spending money on tax breaks, and should be included in any deficit reduction negotiations.


The context of this particular discussion in The Wall Street Journal was an opinion piece written by Harvard University professor, Martin Feldstein, the former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Ronald Reagan.  He started his column, writing:
Putting a cap on tax expenditures -- those features of the tax code that are a substitute for direct government spending -- can break the current physical impasse and prevent the dangerous explosion of the national debts.  If a cap is combined with entitlement reforms, the government will also be able to reduce tax rates and increase some spending to accelerate the economic recovery.
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Yet the distinction between spending cuts and revenue increases breaks down if one considers tax expenditures.  Here are some examples.  If I buy a solar panel for my house, a hybrid car, or an energy-efficient refrigerator, the government pays me.  But, instead of sending me a check, it gives me a tax credit or a tax deduction. . . . .
To be sure, the largest tax expenditures are the deductions that individuals can take on their tax returns for mortgage interest, state-income and local-property taxes paid, and also the exclusions from taxable income from municipal bond interest, and for employer-provided health insurance.  Any attempt to limit such deductions and exclusions would generate fierce opposition.  That is why an overall cap would be more feasible.  [The idea here is to limit the tax savings from all deductions and the two major exclusions to 2 percent cap of the individual's adjusted gross income.]
Professor Feldstein does concede that under his proposal, the 2 percent cap could be modified to retain the existing deduction for all charitable contributions.  According to Professor Feldstein, the existing charitable deduction deserves to be maintained because unlike other deductions and exclusions, it does not benefit the taxpayer directly but provides important private support for universities, religious and cultural institutions, and hospitals.  Since under present tax law, the charitable deduction is not limited only to universities, religious and cultural institutions, and hospitals, I am assuming that the professor is not limiting his discussion of exempting charitable deductions from his overall 2 percent cap proposal to those institutions alone.

But, what caught my eye in the follow-on discussion was the idea that the "charitable-deduction tax benefits" included in Feldstein's proposal, which are according to both Feldstein and the responder, "expenditures [that] clearly benefit all taxpayers by supporting the quasi-government function performed by legitimate charities and education institutions."   Is this really what is going on here, and if so, how does one define a government function, and distinguish between that and a quasi-government function, and one which really has no relationship at all with the purpose or nature of government?

A society conscious of its place in history is seldom content to note changes in circumstances with no attempt to understand or evaluate their meaning.  We make these evaluations because we are not content with mere descriptions of events or recitations of facts and statistics.  We want to understand their meaning or significance, but we cannot do that without having an idea about end toward which those events and trends are leading.  If these teleological visions are the collections of values, often having a strong emotional force even if we are not conscious of them or their components, it at least behooves us to understand what these visions might be and how their emotional forces drive a society in certain directions.

This raises some interesting questions about an analytical framework for thinking about some of these things.  If Arnold Toynbee was right that "the crucial questions confronting Western Man were all religious," because of the inevitable dependence of a society's actions on its beliefs, then why does any emphasis on ideas and beliefs find skeptical criticism in so many circles.  As Os Guinness once wrote, we do not see the environment because we see with it.  We are so influenced by ideas that we do not notice that we are not aware of their affect on us.

One way to look at this is that idolatry may be one way to understand what is going on.  People are by nature worshipping and may worship nature, money, mankind, power, history, social and political systems and anything that might take them away from the Creator.  So, people can place anything or anyone at the top of his or her pyramid of values, and that is what he or she ultimately serves.  So, my argument is that this concept and framework is a good framework to understand our societies, and the forces that may drive us to think about the relationship between government and civil society, as well as other instruments of control, such as family and the market.

To be sure, there is a plethora of charities in the United States, and it is the most open and democratic society in the world.  According to a report in The Chronicle of Philanthropy on 24 February 2013:
This open system has benefits: It allows for new idea, new blood, new causes, and new hope.  But it also extracts a significant cost: The torrent of new and old charities creates confusion in the marketplace and stretches limited funds over too many organizations. As a result, even the most effective charities struggle to expand their services and tackle large-scale social problems with large-scale resources.
Of course, the question maybe should be: Should they attempt to tackle large-scale social problems with large-scale resources?  Maybe it is at this point the the confusion occurs, not just in the marketplace, but also as to the relationship between government functions and those functions performed by charity or civil society.

One of the things that is going on here in the US in political discussions, especially those about the roles of government, mainly the central government, and the financial and debt crisis, is how the government can balance its budget by increasing "revenues" through limiting deductions.

But, it does seem to me that there are some more fundamental issues that are more important than simply the revenues issue.  These are important because they bear on the question of what kind of society a people should desire and what policies are necessary to inform the development of that society.

Divine revelation teaches us four major foundational principles with public policy implications, each consistent with the meaning of, and advancement of, a life of caritas, interestingly enough, the name of a prominent and internationally recognized faith-based charity.

If we are to understand the foundations of political society, it would be well to begin with the Christian understanding of the person, "the beginning, the subject, and the object of every social organization," as Gaudium et Spes tells us and as the wisest among the ancient Romans taught.  We find four core principles in the opening pages of the book of Genesis: the dignity of human life; the dignity of marriage and family; the dignity of what we call today, religious freedom; and the dignity of implacement.

We find first the declaration that God made man in His image and likeness.  This has been interpreted by Thomas Aquinas and others to refer to our spiritual powers, our freedom, our intellect and will, our powers of moral deliberation, judgment, and choice.  We are not mere atoms in a zero-sum struggle to survive, as Hobbesian individualism supposes.  Nor are we mere means to some social ends, as collectivist ideologies hold.  Rather, we are social beings, equal in dignity, who are personal and social beings fulfilled as persons in relationship with other persons.

The second fundamental principle is the dignity of the most basic social unit, the foundation of the family.  The core of marriage and family is not determined by human law or conventions, although they can recognize and support it, or can obscure it.

The third fundamental principle is the human right to exercise freedom, especially in moral and religious matters.  Religious freedom is not simply a matter of revealed truth unknowable by rational reflection.  It is established by reason.  Here, it is not simply the freedom to believe and practice in private what one believes.  If it is freedom at all, it is freedom to be open about ones beliefs and to seek to persuade others to share in those beliefs.  Otherwise, it really is not freedom of religion at all.  And, indeed, is not freedom at all.

The fourth fundamental principle is the principle of implacement...  "Fremd bin ich eingezogen, fremd zieh ich wieder aus."  "A stranger came I hither, a stranger go I forth."  One of the characteristics of being human is being implaced.  To exist at all is to have a place.  Since to be human is to be placed, it follows that place results from the human interaction of human beings and their particular locations. This means that place has a cultural context or dimension.  Although "space" and "place" are inseparable, "place" is distinguished from "space" because place is part of our lived experience, whereas "space is theoretical concept and as such is an abstraction from the lived experience of "place."

In our late modern cultural age, we have lost the very human sense of place amidst the time-space compression characteristic of postmodernity and globalization.  Place becomes something we move through, often at great speeds, and virtual reality is not replacement for place.

There is a dehumanizing effect of urban sprawl.  While the city provides "the gift of anonymity and mobility," people suffer not so much from anomie or lack of purpose or sense of rootlessness, which they clearly do, new technological developments in communications threaten to make the city redundant.  People lead detached and uprooted lives of endless choice and no commitment.  There is a human hunger for a sense of place that urban promise cannot satisfy.  There is no meaning apart form roots.

To know who you are is to be oriented in moral space, a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what is not, what has meaning and is important to you, and what is trivial and secondary.

It is where we learn about anger, anxiety, love, and move toward wholeness through experiencing these objects for us "in some common space," which is shared by a defining community.  By common experience of our place, and by common care for it, we build up also our sense of belonging to one another.

There is a significant gap between society and the state, so it is possible to be free at the Constitutional level in the terms of the structures of liberty, and become, subservient and servile at the citizens' level in terms of the spirit of liberty.

All this got me thinking again about various understandings of civil society, and specifically, about the nature and role of civil society.  If government is so omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent, and caring for the welfare of the people, then why do we even need charities, NGOs, or CSOs?

There are certain assumptions behind these proposals and discussion that are often overlooked.

The first assumption is that the government is, indeed, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent.   As a result, when disaster strikes, only government has the presence, expertise and wisdom, and power to know what needs to be done to provide for its people.  But, this is not limited only to disasters, whether natural or made by humans, such as war, but includes the ability to know what is best for society, to provide for the welfare of society, as well as protect society from outside harm. 

But, what is the source of this authority and power claimed by governments to be all things to all people?  One theory in modern political thought as to the source of this authority and power, is "social contract theory," which is the method for justifying political principles and arrangements by appeal to the agreement that would have been made among suitably situated rational, free, and equal persons.  How English philosopher Thomas Hobbes would define that would be different than how American philosopher John Rawls might define it.

But the basic question is: What holds society together?  Modern assumptions about the relationship between the individual and society, private property and ownership, rationality, economics, and the market, and the rights and responsibilities of citizenship have all been shaped by social contract theory.

The basic idea involved in the quest was to discover rational principles for the construction of a civil polity that would not be subject to destruction from within.  Because virtually any government would be better than civil war, according to Hobbes's analysis, all but absolute governments are systematically prone to dissolution into civil war.  People ought, therefore, to submit themselves to an absolute political authority.  Stability requires that they also refrain from the sorts of action that might undermine a regime.

So, when people mutually covenant with each other and others in the community to obey a common authority, they have established what Hobbes calls "sovereignty by institution."  The social covenant is implied by the presence and participation in the community.

Most theorists are driven by two basic questions: The first, by what right or need are people driven to form "states?"  The second, what is the best form a "state" can take?  These fundamental questions involve a conceptual distinction between the concepts of "state" and "government."  Whereas "state" refers to the set of enduring institutions through which power would be distributed and its use justified, "government" refers to a specific group of people who occupy institutions of state, create laws and ordinances by which people would be bound, and enforce and interpret such laws and ordinances.

So, how does this assumption work in the context of the competence and capability of government as the omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent and caring agent for the welfare of the state?

There was a column in the Washington Post recently, that commented on a story in the local Washington area news.  Joshua Welch, a 7 year-old boy was suspended from second grade in his elementary school.  While eating a Pop-Tart, a sweet, fruit-filled breakfast pastry children like, he was biting it to form the shape of a mountain.  As he was eating away at the Pop-Tart, he realized it looked more like a gun than a mountain, and pointing it at a friend, he said, "Bang, bang." Quite natural, it seems, for 7 year-old boys.  The school administrator, in addition to suspending the young boy from school, sent a letter home to his parents urging them to use the "incident" as a teaching moment with their children, "in a manner you deem appropriate.

In another "incident," a 5 year-old girl was labeled a "terroristic threat," and suspended from her kindergarten class and ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation because she talked about shooting herself and others with her "Hello Kitty gun," a harmless plastic gun that blew water bubbles.

Both schools, with their caring concern for the safety of the young students, worried about "bullying" at their respective schools and about the enforcement of their zero tolerance for the guns and weapons on school property, even if only as chewed up Pop-Tarts, and bubble shooting plastic guns.  These episodes define for us as citizens what words or images or actions can interfere with an individual's ability "to participate in a safe and supportive learning environment," and the nature of the regulatory state that can be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent.

When I was in China in December 2012, there was a new movie opening in the theaters about the famine in Henan Province in 1942.  The title of the movie was Back to 1942.  This has caused me to think a lot about whether there is no role for civil society where governments are presumed to provide all that is needed for a good society.  Then, just in the last few days, I had lunch with a friend who experienced this famine as a young boy.

Here is a summary of his story.  His grandfather, a twenty-six year old Cambridge University educated doctor, left behind his world of Europe and went to China to open up a hospital in Henan Province, at that time, China's most populous province, where the need for medicine was overwhelming.  In June 1900, the Empress Dowager issued a decree that all foreigners must be killed. By the time of the Boxer Rebellion was over, 250 missionaries and more than 32,000 Chinese Christians had been killed.

When the Rebellion broke out in the late 1880s his grandfather, with only three years experience in China, found himself in an old medieval capital, taking refuse in a loft infested with cockroaches and rats, with little or no food or drink.  Finally, he was able to escape and began the dangerous 1000 mile journey through Boxer-infested country to the coast and safety.

My friend's parents, also missionaries in China during the 1930s to the early 1950s, faced similar horrors, pursuit by bandits, the rising tide of Communist insurgents, the daily strategies to escape the assaults of Japanese bombers, and the horrors of the Japanese massacre of Nanjing.

But as my friend recounts his childhood in China, nothing had prepared his family for the unmitigated horror of the Henan famine in the winter of 1942-43, where according to some reports, five million people died in the space of three months.

"The devastation of the drought, aggravated by the ravages of war and the callousness and ineptitude of the distant, uncaring government of Chaing Kai-shek, made for a disaster beyond comprehension."  Food became the sole business of life and the one desperate obsession.  As reported in the movie, Back to 1942, and in the report of my friend, Time correspondent and author Theodore White, "parents sold their children for food, and rumors of cannabilism were rife.  Fundamentally, there was no idea that could embrace what was happening.  . . .  Compassion, kinship, customs, morals were swept away."

His mother, a surgeon, but without food and medicine was unable to bring medical help to the sick and dying.  His family, as isolated Westerners in an ocean of despair, were besieged with impossible requests and burdened with hopes that could not be fulfilled.  Babies were left on their doorsteps, beggars clung to them in the streets, and officials plead for food and medicine that his parents did not have even for themselves.  His two brothers died during this famine, and his family, with many others, began a long treck from Henan to India.

Os Guinness also tells the story of Prisoner 174517 in his book, Unriddling Our Times.  The story is well-known, but I think bears some repeating here as I think about the assumption, if I am right, about the alleged omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence of government.  Whereas, the Hunan famine represented either a a simple neglect, or more probably callous disregard on the part of three rivals to government, and perhaps the direct infliction of evil, in the case of the Auschwitz extermination camp, the direct evil actions of government are more clearly evident.

So, according to the report, Prisoner 174517 was thirsty.   Seeing a fat icicle hanging just outside his barracks in Auschwitz, he reached for it, broke it off to taste it to quench his thirst.  But, before he could get the icicle to his mouth, the guard snatched it out of his hand and threw it to the ground where it broke into pieces on the dirty ground.  "Why," the prisoner instinctively shouted out.  "Here there is no why," replied the guard with a tone of brutal finality.

As Os writes, that, for Primo Levi, the Italian Jewish scientist and writer was the essence of the death camps.  While it centers here on the evil perpetrated during the war and period leading to the war, it also represents the unchallenged arbitrary authority of the state.

Although Primo Levi survived, at least physically and outwardly, the experiences of the death camp at Auschwitz, he could not bear the burden of witnessing to that experience, and more than 40 years lady, he died as he plunged down a staircase to his death in suicide.  In doing so, feeling the burden of witnessing, the guilt of surviving, the horror of revisionist denials, the dimming of memory, and the depression from all of this, he joined the list of those who were victims of the Nazi death camps and either died in them or took their own lives after the liberation of the camps.

But, of course, these may be extreme examples today, although not totally foreign to what happens in some places in the world even today.  There are still ways in which governments show their omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence in ways that may suppress or depress freedoms.

More common is the intrusive nature of an omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent state into everyday life.  One example that represents this nature in all facets of human life and with many direct adverse effects on the work of civil society and charitable organizations is the statutory and regulatory scheme implementing the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, also known as ObamaCare, in the United States.

Historically, healthcare in hospitals in the United States has been provided by the nonprofit  and charity sector.  Indeed, today, approximately 60 percent of all hospitals in the United States are nonprofit, while approximately 25 percent are government owned.  The remaining hospitals, fewer than 1,000 are for profit.  Religious groups, especially Catholic orders, and Protestant denominational groups opened many of these facilities as charitable institutions.

For example, before the birth of modern medicine, hospitals were poorhouses where indigents went to die.  With the advent of modern medicine, and especially medicines, such as, antibiotics, and the revolution in medical schools, healthcare became much more effective but expensive.  By the late 1920s, hospitals noticed that their beds were often empty because people did not go into hospitals unless they were deathly ill.  An official at Baylor University Hospital in Dallas, Texas noticed that people were spending more for cosmetics than for medical care.  So, Baylor Hospital started offering a deal to a group of public school teachers in Dallas in which the teachers would pay 50 cents each month into a plan in exchange for Baylor Hospital picking up the tab on hospital visits.  When the Great Depression hit the United States, hospitals around the county saw the patient load disappear. The Baylor plan and idea became hugely popular and eventually got the name, Blue Cross.  World War II became the catalyst for spreading the idea.

In 1943, the Internal Revenue Service, IRS, ruled that employer-based health care should be tax free. In 1954, further law made this plan even more attractive.  During the post-war infrastructure boom, the federal government offered subsidies to cities that wanted hospitals.  But, obtaining this subsidy required nonprofit status and a promise to provide a "community public benefit."  The IRS originally defined community benefit to mean that three percent of the operating revenue was to be used for taking care of patients who could not afford to pay for the service.  Tax-exempt status became a good deal if one considered the avoidance of sales tax, property tax, and income tax.  The various states had different standards for the amount of money that must be spent on charity in order to stay nonprofit.

Thus, the employer-based insurance which started with Blue Cross selling coverage to teachers in Dallas and spread because of government price controls and tax breaks, became the natural system through which people with good jobs got their health care through work, while those without looked to the government.

While a good deal of attention has been given to the effect of ObamaCare on individuals of various classifications and on the potential role of the states in implementing the exchanges, less has been said about the effect that the law will have on hospitals and health systems.

The most common thinking is that ObamaCare reform will cause consolidation of hospitals and health providers.  But, the effect on hospitals, especially those within the nonprofit sector may be even more radical.  Although many hospitals are able to maintain the public or community benefit status percentages for uncompensated care, when 30 million more people projected to obtain health insurance as a result of ObamaCare, the numbers of uninsured and nonpaying patients will fall and hospitals' tax-exempt status could be threatened.  Moreover, although many hospitals suffer financial losses as a result of services provided to Medicaid patients, those losses do not count as charity under current rules.

Assuming that the number of uninsured and nonpaying patient load decreases in 2014 when ObamaCare goes into full effect, nonprofit hospitals will face two options.  The first is to convert themselves into for-profit enterprises.  Indeed, this is already happening in places like Detroit, Boston, Scranton, and Miami where for profit chains are taking over old Roman Catholic and Protestant systems, as well as other nonprofit healthcare systems.  Many people committed to the mission of charitable hospital care would prefer this option because they like the mission of caring for their community.

The other option would be for the hospitals, or hospital associations, and governments to agree on a new community benefit standard which unlike the old would not depend on taking uninsured and nonpaying patients for free.

The ObamaCare statute, which is approximately 2,500 pages long, is now implemented by proposed regulations that are approximately 20,000 pages long.  The application for ObamaCare is 15 pages long, and if government subsidy is sought, the application is 60 pages.  The applications are more complicated than a complex tax return.  The applications appeared online without warning or notice.  Most of the information sought is irrelevant to the issue of any request for subsidized health care support.

At the time of enactment, the statute was considered too long for the legislators to have read it before voting on it.  We can presume that the everyone effected by this law, including the hospitals, doctors, patients, insurance companies, and bureaucrats enforcing the law and regulation will have read and understood the regulation.
While medical care provided by charitable institutions, particularly those with religious foundations may have seemed to be much simpler and charitable, it is not difficult to imagine such charitable institutions performing quasi-government services now that they are being prescribed by the Affordable Care Act of 2010 with all of the new and additional government agencies involved, and the expanded government agencies at activities as depicted in this chart.  Moreover, with all the information required by the new application forms, most of which is financial, health care becomes little more than a series of financial transactions rather that what it was originally intended to be.  As this chart shows, the government is indeed omnipresent!

Perhaps the idea of the work of charities and civil society organizations performing "quasi-government functions," justifies a highly regulated environment, especially if charities are granted a tax-exempt status and contributors to charities are entitled to a deduction on their tax returns for contributions made to charities.

Government grows because well-meaning people like you and me believe it should do certain things that seem beyond controversy -- find a cure for cancer, stop air and water pollution, keep violence off television, hold back some aggressor in some hot spot in the world -- something that everyone seems to agree should be done.  Whatever, the goal, it is easy to imagine that a single-minded government could achieve it.

The basic idea behind this first assumption is the view of power as an idol.  The most characteristic feature of modern life and one which impinges on virtually every area of human life has been the development of the nation-state.  The state will provide for us whatever prosperity could not.  The paternal state not only feeds its children, but nurtures, educates, conforts, and disciplines them, providing for all they need  for their security.  Our whole lives are their business.  The paternalism of the state is that of a the bad parent who wants his children to be dependent upon him for ever.  The great crime is that it transforms the state from being a gift of God to protect us against violence, into an idol we worship and on which we depend for all of our needs.

If the source of authority is what is called "social contract theory," as political philosophers suggest, at what point does the authority of government depend upon the consent of the people and at what point is freedom important in a governed society?

So, reasonable questions might include: Where are we, and how did we get here?  What kind of people do others think we are? What kind of people do we think we are?  Do we love freedom, and if so, how do we sustain it?

While thinkers, and indeed we as a people, may understand democracy in different ways, a second assumption is that freedom and democracy are important and cherished values among all humans.  But sometimes, freedom may only be understand as a grant of the state.

Augustine argued that the best way to define a people is by their loved thing held in common.  While Os Guinness would say that, "Freedom is unquestionably what Americans love supremely, and love of freedom is what makes Americans the people they are," I suspect many people in other lands would wish for such freedom, or maybe love the freedoms that they have.  And as Guinness points out, "freedom is at the very heart and soul of the modern world, especially in its Western forms." How else would we explain the asserted claims of freedom of religion, free-speech, free-choice, free vote, free-markets, if freedom is not today's highest virtue?  Freedom is the dream of ever-expanding emancipation movements and liberation movements?  It is this high idea of human dignity and independence for which free societies strive.  But, why?



If there is any merit to the "social contract theory" of political science as the explanation for justifying political principles and arrangements by appeal to the agreement that would have been made among suitably situated rational, free, and equal persons, and the theory of consent of the governed, then freedom depends constantly on both the character of the nation's leaders and on the character of its citizens.  The principle of the consent of the governed is at the heart of democracy and is crucial to both freedom and to the legitimacy of the state and heart of democracy.

Moreover, free societies must always maintain freedom on two levels at once, namely, at the level of the state's constitution and legal structures, and secondly, at the level of the citizens' convictions, if in fact, freedom is freedom is the highest virtue and the dream of all people and based on human dignity and independence.  The latter level is the informed spirit of liberty, or what has sometimes been called "habits of the heart."

As a result, I do see some validity in this second assumption.  However, freedom always faces a moral challenge.  Freedom requires order and restraint, and yet, the only restraint that does not contradict freedom is self-restraint.  As Guinness says, "Neither law alone nor virtue alone can sustain freedom, because freedom always generated an abuse of power that endangers freedom."  "So law alone will override freedom by its very lack of self-restraint and by its inherent drive to compensate by replacing virtue with regulations."

A recent example of this is the regulatory implementation of the Affordable Healthcare Act of 2010 in the United States, popularly known as ObamaCare.  See my earlier post on this subject: http://www.rvanbroekhoven.blogspot.com/2012/02/government-civil-society-charity-and.html.  Although the Department of Health and Human Services proposed regulation governing the so-called contraception mandate has received attention with respect to its implications for harmful effects on freedom of religion issues, and most specifically the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church, as I wrote earlier, the implications for the civil society sector are profound.

This raises the question: What is government anyway?  It dominates our lives.  It is in the center of most news and public discussion.  What distinguishes government from major corporations, such as IBM, General Motors, Ford, Toyota, Siemens, or civil society organizations, such as the Red Cross, Oxfam, Amnesty International, Care International, Caritas Internationalis, CIVICUS World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Greenpeace International, Plan International, World Vision, and the like? What is it about government that enables it to do what other organizations cannot do?  Is government the only institution that considers the well-being of all citizens?

No institution can do that, and certainly not government.  Anything government gives to one group must be taken away from others.  So, government necessarily plays favorites, which divides people into opposing camps.

The distinctive feature of government is coercion.  It is the use of force and the threat of force to win obedience.  This is how government differs from every other agency in society.  The others persuade; government compels.  When someone wants to help flood victims, or victims from an earthquake, that person is saying that he wants to force people to pay for the relief.  Otherwise, he would be happy to have the Red Cross or some other humanitarian organization, and its supporters handle the problem.

Nothing involving the government is voluntary, as it would be if a private company or private civil society organization does something.  There is simply an element of compulsion in every government activity.
    Being able to force people to do what you want can be an attractive prospect -- especially if you don't have to admit, even to yourself, how you are getting what you want.
    If you want to feed the homeless, you don't have to persuade hundreds of people to donate money.  The government can force millions of people to contribute. 
The constant exhortations to allow the state to relieve us of our difficulties run counter to older injunctions to beware of the power of the state because it robs us of our liberties.  The new dependence on the state reveals a dramatic change in the entire moral fabric of society.  British historian, E. H. Carr embraces this change and identifies it as one of realism belonging to the tradition of Hegel and Marx.  According to Carr, a realist, "makes morality a function of politics" and "cannot logically accept any standard of value save that of fact."

Helping those who cannot help themselves, is a paraphrase of Karl Marx's famous dictum, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need."

Egalitarianism uses a similar moral inversion.  It was once considered immoral to take a person's property for the benefit of others by threatening use of force.  Now, inequality is advanced as a greater evil than theft.

But, as I wrote in my last post here, there are things, such as the relief efforts after the Chinese Sichuan Earthquake in 2008 when government intervention is absolutely essential.  Even with all the losses of freedom and the coercive nature of government activities there, only government could do some of the things which it did in Sichuan Province.

Nevertheless, according to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Government can do only what is specified and delegated to it in the Constitution.  All the rest of live's activities -- charity, education, regulation of business, crime control, etc. -- were to be handled by state governments or the people on their own.

Although Os Guinness is specifically addressing America in his A Free People's Suicide: Sustainable Freedom in the American Future, what he says about the present crisis in America, a crisis of cultural authority, variously described as a crisis of faith and a legitimate crisis of civilizational morale, where "the center no longer holds; the core has lost its compelling power; the moral and social ecology of the nation has been contaminated; the different spheres of society are undermining each other; and the escalation of extremes is underway," is quite applicable around the world, not just in America.  According to Guinness:
What we are witnessing is a gathering crisis of freedom, stemming from a dangerous neglect of the notion of ordered liberty that alone allows a democracy to be durable and a free people to stay free.  The founders gave no name to their vision of sustainable freedom; Tocqueville called it "habits of the heart," . . . .
     If the founders were correct, contemporary America's pursuit of political leadership without character, economic enterprise without ethics and trust, scientific progress without human values, freedom without virtue and negative freedom without positive freedom can end only in disaster.
* * *
     A sustainable society is a self-renewing society in which from generation to generation, the citizens choose to do what the society needs them to do if it is to last -- in other words, a society in which leaders and citizens alike have cultivated the habits of the heart to do without thinking what they need to do if they were to think about it.
As Guinness points out quoting from a well-known historian, that the concept and sense of freedom cannot just be learned and understood  by studying the great declarations, such as the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, or great books and writings by great philosophers, like John Locke or Edmund Burke.  Rather, in the words of Alexander Hamilton,
The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or dusty records.  They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself.
Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.  They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
There is nothing in the Declaration of Human Rights that tells us the source for this freedom, dignity, and these rights.  Oxford University philosopher in his 1958 lecture, "Two Concepts of Liberty," spoke of negative freedom as freedom from -- in essence, freedom from individual and constraint, and positive freedom as freedom for -- in essence, freedom for excellence according to whatever vision and ideals define that excellence.  Both must be held in balance, and both can be distorted.  There is something about the Feldstein proposal for the treatment of tax expenditures that does both, although he does seem to allow some freedom with respect to the contributions to charity, or at least to certain charities.

Again, while America may not be unique in this respect, the concept of negative and positive freedom applies broadly.  As Guinness points out in his A Free People's Suicide:
     . . .  [N]o positive freedom is self-evident except to those who believe in it.  Even "humanitarian intervention" is not self-evident.  It happens to be the term Hitler used to justify invading the Sudetenland and Mussolini used to justify his seizure of Ethiopia. Humanitarian intervention that is just must first be morally justified.  It is never self-evident.
     At the same time, Americans must also remember that unconstrained negative freedom can be just as destructive as positive freedom and needs to be guarded against from two directions.  To begin with, unconstrained negative freedom can easily degenerate into apathy and moral callousness, for what begins with freedom from interference easily slides into the freedom of indifference -- "I am happy to be left to myself, so why should I care about others?"  Thus, emancipation from the constraints of others quickly becomes an evasion of concern for others.  "I don't care what you do" becomes "What happens to you is no business of mine," so that no one becomes their brother's keeper.
Perhaps none of this makes any sense unless there is the foundational understanding that freedom is connected in some way with the inherent nature of human dignity and "of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family," in the words of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In this regard, all visions, including those teleological visions which try to define for us as a society, the "good life" and "common good" are freighted with religious content whether we are prepared to recognize or admit it.  Whereas, humanitarianism stresses the practice of doing good for people who need help on the basis of the idea of humanity as a deity, Christianity teaches that humans are created beings in the image of God, and as such, there is an inherent human dignity with all members of the human family.

A third assumption is that all the resources in a given geographical area somehow belong to the government, maybe collectively for all the people, but at least belong to the government for governmental determination as to how they are to be used.  I get this from the language frequently used politicians, and economic tax experts which refers to the granting of exemptions, tax credits, and itemized deductions allowed for state and local taxes, medical expenses, mortgage interest payments, and charitable contributions for example.

 So, we tend to speak of these kinds of features of our tax codes as tax expenditures, as if the government owns the money, and gives it to the taxpayer according to certain accepted tax policies.  So, as Professor Feldstein wrote in his Wall Street Journal column, "To be sure, the largest tax-expenditures are the deductions that individuals take on their tax returns for mortgage interest, state-income tax and local property taxes paid, and exclusions from taxable income from municipal bond interest, and for employer provided health insurance."

Although I am not an economist, financial wizard, or tax expert, I understand the concept of stewardship.  I just don't believe that this concept applies to my assets and income as belonging to the government or to the public at large, and that as trustee of those resources, I am obligated to hold them in trust for the benefit of the government.

A fourth assumption that I think lies behind this discussion is the assumption  that what "legitimate" charities do, or what civil society organizations do, is to is to expend resources that clearly belong to the government for those purposes recognized by the government as meeting some obligation of government, that benefit all taxpayers, and can be described as a "quasi-government function."



The essence of this is that governments determine what is the public benefit and in the interest of the state, either through its legislative, executive (including regulatory), and perhaps its judicial authority. Of course, even in its granting of tax exempt status in those countries in which that is allowed, the government already makes a determination of what the public benefit is, even in the most general terms.

If the cost of providing the goods and services is ultimately borne by the government or on the behalf of the government, then it would seem that the government would have the ultimate say in how those "tax expenditures" are made or authorized.  In those cases of direct funding or grants, this essentially reduces the work and operations of civil society organizations to executing government programs on behalf of the government.  But, as we have seen in many places, it deprives the charity or civil society organization of building community support for the project, including funding support through donations and contributions.  When, government funding ceases, or is reduced, the civil society organization is left without the ability to function and perform its basic mission.

What is lacking in this discussion is what belongs legitimately to government and what belongs legitimately to the people acting in their own behalf or for their own purposes.  If, the "tax expenditures" are recognized for "quasi-governmental functions," then how are tax deductions authorized for such things as contributions and dues to sports clubs, union activities, and churches, for example, which might not normally be identified with government functions, particularly in a free society?

What is the legal or philosophical basis for determining what is a government function within the constitutional framework of a particular state, and the extent which the functions performed by the "legitimate" charities and educational institutions may be considered "quasi-governmental?"  Assuming, of course, that when we speak of "quasi" we mean "as if; almost as it were; analogous to."   In other words, as used in legal phraseology, it is intended to indicate that one subject resembles another with which it is compared, in certain characteristics, but that there are certain intrinsic and material differences between them that keep them from being identical.

When the foundations of a society are undermined, when the principles of anthropology are not considered and applied to policy decisions, the roles of government and of charity become nothing more than financial transactions.  The moral justification for performing any of these social welfare and public benefit functions is lost, or at least diminished.  These include the principles that God made man in His image and likeness which is essential to human dignity, that marriage and the family also bear the divine image, and are the foundation of a society, that freedom of religion is not only essential to the right to believe, worship, and even persuade others to believe, it involves the recognition that both humans and religion are social, and that being human involves being in a particular place.

While there clearly will often be some overlap between some of the activities of civil society organizations and government, particularly in the social welfare and educational realm, the assumption that civil society organizations are performing quasi-government functions obscures the central role of civil society and raises the question as to how they can be regarded as being the "third sector."

As a result of the "social contract theory" and its rationale, the fifth assumption, it seems to me, is that the legitimacy of government and of government action may not only be derived from that social covenant notwithstanding at social contract theory.  The powers of legislation, enforcement, taxation, war-making, and perhaps in some respects, the right of control of normative doctrine, are connected in such a way that the loss of one may thwart the effective exercise of the others.

What has been happening in the United States, and I suspect elsewhere in the world, has been what has been, what social scientists call, the framing of concerns about the changing character of society in terms of the concept of "social capital."

As Professor Robert Putnam points out in Bowling Alone:
    Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among individuals -- social networks and norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them  In that sense, social capital is closely related to what some have called "civic virtue."  The difference is that "social capital" calls attention  to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social relations.  A society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in in social capital.
So, the core idea of social capital theory is that social networks have value.  The idea is not simply that individual clout and companionship are all there is to social capital.  Rather, we expect it to effect the wider community.  So social capital can be both a "private good" and a "public good" where people outside the network receive benefit and benefit also rebounds to the immediate interest of the person making the investment.  As Yogi Berra once said: "If you don't go to somebody's funeral, they won't come to yours."

In the case of faith-based institutions, the lack of separate identity and function mutes the moral witness by sending mixed signals and curbs their freedom to live their faith by providing vital services, including social and communal connections to others.  As Gerhard Ludwig Müller wrote in a recent essay,
     Either way, something is lost.  For religious communities are valuable not only for the social services they provide. Even from a perspective of the common good, they are not interchangeable with secular entities.  Religious organizations do not just serve the beneficiaries; they fulfill their participants in genuine communion.  These and other free associations do not just offer what the state could provide; they also mediate between state and the individual.  They foster virtues on which depend a well-ordered society and even the state itself.
      Indeed, their purpose is not always merely instrumental.  The flourishing of our free associations can have its own value, for we are social beings.  Solidarity fulfills us.  All of this is obscured or denied by a state that hampers religious and other social and cultural enterprises by imposing on them unjustly, [or simply treats these religious and other social or cultural enterprises as arms of the state performing quasi-government functions].
Because of our need for, and respect for these association, we can affirm the principle of subsidiarity. Negatively, we know that this means that it is unjust to assign to greater and higher organizations what lessor and subordinate organizations can do.  Positively, we know that a healthy society requires nested and overlapping forms of free community to thrive where each makes its own contribution, by its own initiative and authority, to the common good.

Pope Benedict XVI, put it this way:
When those responsible for the public good attune themselves to the natural human desire for self-governance based on subsidiarity, they leave space for individual responsibility and initiative, but most importantly, they leave space for love.
In other words, subsidiarity is implicit in the dignity and inviolability of the individual, the family, and the religious community.  There are many bounds and limits on the state's authority.  Therefore, as these foundations are undermined, the state looms larger.  As the state expands into areas that are properly within the sphere of the individual, the family, the religious community, and social and cultural institutions, they are weakened, and their dignity obscured.

While I do not deny a role for the state, it appears to me that the assumptions as articulated above generally do not support the conclusion that anything charity, or civil society does, must be regarded as performing some quasi-government function where the costs and investment of resources are to be regarded as tax expenditures.

As some thinkers, such as Jürgen Habermas have noted, the Christian vision that many seek to extinguish or render irrelevant, in fact provides the best basis for the state's broad goals of protecting human rights and the common good.  This point is lost on those who would deny a place in public life for religious faith, and who depict religion as a force for superstition and prejudice.  Faith and reason shed light on our true worth and destiny, making deeper virtue possible.






Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Civil Society and External Threats

In my previous post on 1 February 2013, Global Trends in Civil Society, I mentioned an article in a CIVICUS publication in which it was reported that with the growth of civil society in scale and importance over recent years, so also has its vulnerability to threats or challenges from three directions.  One of those is the external threat by political authorities challenging the civil society's right to exist or to operate in accordance with its values and purposes.  It is this external threat that is the focus of this post.

The Washington Post carried a recent article about volunteers in Russia and how the Russian Parliament is weighing a law to bring any volunteer activity under the purview of the state.

The headline was from Itomyla, Russia, a decaying farm village about five hour's drive from Moscow.  A country doctor, Sergei Vishnyakov, had been the only doctor in this village since 1981 when he was assigned there right out of medical school.  Although the 15 bed hospital had a annual budget of $25,000, which included his salary, he had come to love his work and all of the families in this village and supplemented his salary with home-grown potatoes, pickles, and about 20 chickens.

Dmitry Aleshkovsy, a former news photographer, tried to help save this tiny dilapidated village hospital with the indifferent health bureaucracy responsible for its operations.  He led a group of young men, all volunteers from Moscow, bringing equipment, money, furniture, and good cheer.  The Health Ministry planned to downgrade this hospital to a recovery center where there would be no treatment offered.  The hospital, although small, served a district of 112 villages or about 3000 residents.  The nearest hospital was 30 miles away in the city of Rzhev, with bus service on Saturdays and Sundays.

The hospital was set up in Soviet times to serve the huge collective farm that included Itomlya and the surrounding district.  The farm has closed and the fields are now full of saplings where flax once grew.  Most of the men who were not engaged in illegal logging migrated to Moscow searching for work.

Whereas mechanical accidents use to be the major contributor to Servei Vishnyanko's work, today it is alcoholism and age related infirmities.

Almost two years ago, the Washington Post carried a story about how Russian medical care was hobbled by corruption, meager salaries, ill-conceived laws, a shortage of medical workers and an overbearing government bureaucracy.  A prominent leading physician, Leonid Roshal, who was also president of the National Medical Chamber, addressed some of the complaints to then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in a  medical conference.  Mr. Putin did not dispute the allegations.  Leonid Roshal concluded that all of this was directed by the Health Ministry bureaucracy that was painfully lacking in people with medical training.  According the Roshal, the Ministry treats doctors who care about the quality of medical care as "intrusive flies."

 Protests erupted around the country as protesters lined the city streets with signs detailing the conditions that health-care workers faced.  During a TV call-in show in December 2010, a cardiologist told the Prime Minister that the conditions that Mr. Putin saw during his recent visit were faked for his benefit.

Now some context to the visit by the volunteers to the hospital in Itomlya.  After a year of dissent and protests, many violent, now President Putin has relentlessly demonstrated his determination to quell dissent.  In an apparent attempt to frighten demonstrators on the eve of his inauguration as President, 17 protesters were arrested and prosecuted for their part in the protest rally, and accused of attacking police officers.

A newly passed law defined treason so broadly that Russians were afraid that even associating with foreigners could put them at peril.  Penalties for slander and violations of ruled governing rallies were toughened.  As of 21 November 2012, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) receiving money from abroad must register as foreign agents.  The Moscow Helsinki Group and others have said that they will defy the law.

Legislation to regulate volunteers has been introduced in the State Duma, or lower house of Parliament, by President Putin's United Russia party.  The theory is that people who want to organize to do good work are a threat to the state's power.  Backers also say that this proposed law will ensure that volunteer activity conforms to the government's priorities and does not conflict with Kremlin policy.  These are all points I made in a public lecture I gave in Shantou University, Guangdong Province, China in late November 2012, and included in my recent blog post on 4 February 2013.

But, Russian officials are not the only ones hostile to voluntarism.  As reported in the recent Washington Post article, Russia's Soviet past, when the government controlled all aspects of life, has left it with a population that is accustomed to the idea that government should provide for its citizens and a population which is suspicious of volunteer organizations.  Indeed, a recent 2012 poll found that more than half of Russia's population disapproves of volunteer organizations.

And yet, despite these attempts, there are volunteer organizations in Russia, such as the group led by Dmitry Aleshkovsky, the former news photographer, Volunteers on Wheels, a Facebook community where people with needs and drivers who want to help find each other; or another volunteer group, Tugeza, which in English is "together," which has grown to include 3,000 members of Facebook, who are involved with volunteer work with cystic fibrosis patients, cooking hearty meals for a children's hospital which are delivered by members of the Volunteers on Wheels.

Authorities are clear about their hostility toward volunteer work.  As reported by Will England and Kathy Lally in their 2 February 2013 article in the Washington Post, "in 2010, after deep cuts in the forest service, volunteers tried to help put out peat fires that sent choking smoke throughout much of European Russia."  According to some of the volunteers reported on social media, police stopped them demanding bribes to let them through.

One group, Liza Alert, was organized to conduct volunteer searches for missing persons when it became clear that the police weren't interested in doing so.  After a year, there was grudging indifference on the part of police rather than outright interference which the volunteer group faced in the beginning.

Volunteer organizers say that most of the resistance they face is more subtle, usually in the form of bureaucratic delays and lack of cooperation.  Some groups, such as Volunteers on Wheels, led by Yevgeny Grekov, make a point of not formally organizing so that they can avoid legal complications.

The China Quarterly, Volume 198, June 2009, carried an article, " Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts: The Emergence of Civil Society in China?" by Jessica C. Teets, in which she analyzed the May 2009 massive earthquake that struck Sichuan Province in China.  According to the State Council Information Office, the death toll from this earthquake was approximately 70,000, with approximately 10,000 confirmed schoolchild deaths resulting from 7,000 collapsed classrooms.  Another 18,000 were reported missing.


There was a significant outpouring of donations and volunteers, leading many to believe that, similar to the SARS crisis in 2003, relief and reconstruction efforts would strengthen civil society in China.

According to many analysts, participation in relief efforts increases civil society groups' capacity through expanded volunteer and donor base, improved property management experience, and through demonstration to the government the potentially positive role played by civil society.  Group relief efforts also have the potential to create habits of trust and participation on behalf of the government, potential volunteers, and donors, many of whom are distrustful or ignorant of civil society.

Since the 1980s, many organizations broadly identified as nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations (NGO, NPO) have formed to deliver services and advocate for certain groups in society.  Jianxing Yu and Sujian Guo, in their introduction, "The Relationship Between Civil Society and Governance in China," in Civil Society and Governance in China, pointed out that:
     Civil-society studies began in China in the early 1990s, through roots that can be traced back to China's reform and opening that began in 1978.  At the time, analysts started stressing the importance of the social sphere outside the state, signifying the decline of the monopoly of statist-oriented approaches to the study of China's political and social development.  Although there has been no consensus among Chinese scholars on the concept of civil society and its applicability in China, despite the fact that the state still controls and dominates major social resources, the notion of "state and society relations" continues to provide a helpful approach to the study of social changes in China since 1978.
* * *
     However, the idea of "civil society" is derived from Western historical experience, so it may prove problematic as a way of understanding social change in societies with very different historical trajectories and social characteristics.  . . .
     Recognizing the tension between Western concepts and Chinese realities, many scholars of civil society have advanced more nuanced frameworks.
These have included: a model of "interactive relations" between civil society and the state, arguing that endogenous tensions of civil society would require the necessary but rational interference of the state; a model in which there is the construction of a "socialist civil society" and a "strong-state society" in the Chinese context which interact with each other to influence actions and outcomes; and models built on concepts of "corporatism," "state in society." and "cooperation between state and society" in which the enhanced power of social forces do not necessarily reduce the power of the state, but would create a "win-win" situation in which society and state cooperate productively with each other.

Dr. Jessica Teets, in her paper, "Post-Earthquake Relief and Reconstruction Efforts" in The China Quarterly 2009, picks up some of these ideas when she states that past debates on civil society in China were based on a model of civil society developed by Jurgen Habermas, positing a public sphere autonomous from the state and composed of groups of voluntary associations.  According to Teets, the key criterion for the idealized civil society, "one that plays an oppositional role to the state and fosters democracy, is that associations composing civil society must be autonomous from the state."

While this debate is beyond the scope of this post, one of the insights in Civil Society and Governance in China is the distinct ways of examining the concept of civil society, that is, from a political or sociological or humanitarian perspective.  This may well help us understand some of the relational tensions between the state and civil society, no matter where they are found.

Understanding some of these distinctions, it is easier to contextualize areas of perceived weakness as identified by Dr. Teets in her analysis of the relief and recovery period following the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, and indeed understand some of the external threats which are the focus of this post.  Based on her analysis of the role of civil society in Sichuan, and particularly on her interviews with groups and government agencies participating in the relief efforts, she found that in three areas of civil society -- capacity, mobilization ability, and relationship with local government -- the initial outcomes of participation in relief efforts were ambiguous.

Areas of perceived weakness included: lack of trust by many Chinese who chose to bypass organized civil society groups and participate directly in relief efforts or via local government; lack of project management experience, adequate auditing process, and lack of professional or trained volunteers reflecting a capacity deficit; inability to organize quickly and inability to assist in relief efforts coherently and gain access to disaster areas, while duplicating the efforts of others; lack of voluntariness in domestic donations from companies agencies, and individuals.  These are basically the internal threats to civil society organizations stated in the CIVICUS paper.

One observation made by Dr. Teets is consistent at a  certain level with observations regarding civil society around the world, but perhaps because of China's history and context became more obvious during the relief efforts in Sichuan Province:
     The presence of what many analysts are calling "informal civil society," meaning spontaneous unorganized social action illustrates the difficulty for many groups in mobilizing society outside existing networks.  A common explanation for why so many donors and volunteers bypassed existing civil society organizations is that these groups are seen as ineffective.  "This kind of civil society, based not around formal organisations but around issues, can mobilize more people."  Another explanation is that corporations and citizens do not trust these groups, as evidenced by the low trust levels in the World Values Surveys in China.  As one interviewee noted, "If an ordinary Chinese gives 100 kuai to a group, he wants to see that group spend 100 kuai on the activity.  If the group uses any of that money for administrative costs, the ordinary Chinese thinks that is corruption." Because trust for civil society is low and many doubt groups' capacity to undertake the work, a great deal of the donations and volunteers were not an organized response, but rather a spontaneous one to the tragedy.  While many older Chinese embrace what they see as the younger generation's return to traditions of community assistance from the materialism of the last two decades, this type of social action does not strengthen but rather undermines civil society.  If social action takes place outside organized civil society, these groups will find it difficult to increase their capacity or social trust levels.
Nevertheless, earthquake relief efforts illustrated the increasing project abilities and sources of funding available to civil society organizations, both domestically and internationally through INGOs, or International NGOs, both important indicators of capacity.  Additionally, groups demonstrated the ability to mobilize a large volunteer base quickly.  Many analysts argue that relief efforts created a strong volunteer base for civil society through feelings of social responsibility and habits of volunteering.

Within five hours after the earthquake hit, Amity Foundation had a staff in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, to begin assessing the damage in some of the worst affected counties.  A day later, the United Methodist Committee on Relief issued an emergency appeal and immediately dispatched $50,000 to Amity for relief and rehabilitation work.  Another $10,000 was released to Amity to work with children left parentless after the earthquake.  A year later, Amity Foundation with its relief and rehabilitation work has touched the lives of 400,000 persons, with projects providing community grain storage facilities, clean water and sanitation supply lines, trauma counseling, materials for the construction of homes, technical and construction skills to residents, and rebuilt classrooms and school equipment.

While during the first few weeks following the earthquake and the scale of needs seemed overwhelming, Amity's practice of inventory and noting down the name of each person receiving aid and goods came under criticism by some organizations that thought Amity was not moving fast enough with its relief efforts.  But, it soon became apparent that Amity's system of accountability ensured a fair and equal distribution of goods and services, and reduced the potential for "double-dippers."  Not long thereafter, government officials sought Amity's help in putting those principles and practices of accountability in to place for its emergency distribution work.

In late May 2008, Zhang Qiyu decided to take a break from her studies at an elite university in Beijing and volunteer at a refugee camp for survivors of the Sichuan earthquake.  This 22-year-old young, petite, pony-tailed and bespectacled lady exchanged her urban dormitory for a tent in the Mianzhu countryside among among thousands of the 5 million people made homeless by the earthquake, the most devastating natural disaster in more than 50 years.  Zhang Qiyu and an army of 150,000 other volunteers -- plus130,000 soldiers and tens of thousands of construction workers -- were part of a rebuilding effort that looks set to reshape not just Sichuan, but also the way the nation sees itself and relates to the outside world.  So, while bulldozers, mechanical diggers, and cement mixers dressed wounds on the landscape, Zhang Qiyu was helping heal the psychological scars by caring for infants at the newly-erected children's center.

According to reports in newspaper shortly after the earthquake, Zhang Qiyu exemplified a change that has made China more internally sympathetic and externally assertive.  Her generation was formerly criticized as selfish and materialistic, and as little emperors because of the one-child policy and growing up during a period of rising inequity.  Yet, here was Zhang based at a children's center, a fenced off cluster of tents and prefabricated huts, run by the China Social Entrepreneur Foundation, an NGO set up and approved by the government.  Whereas this NGO was viewed with suspicion by the government as anarchist, the relationship improved as a result of its work with the earthquake and the relief work.  The government now realized how useful NGOs can be.

The World, reported on 28 May 2009, one year after the Sichuan earthquake, that:
     This was the scene in Sichuan last year, at a stadium turned into a camp for people made homeless by the earthquake.  This woman was calling for volunteers, and volunteers were everywhere.  They were sorting through donated cloths and passing out food.  They were carrying signs with the names of the missing to try to reunite families.  All told, nearly $11 billion dollars [sic] was donated for earthquake relief, and some 100,000 volunteers showed up to help.
     "The earthquake tapped into a lot of different things, actually.  I think it wasn't just the empathy or the compassion, it was also a sense of nationalism and other things that really sort of open the floodgates for the giving."
This, according to Grace Chiang Nicolette, managing director of the Social Venture Group in Shanghai.  Further, she said that:
    The big question for those of us in the circle is, "Was that just a one-off because of the earthquake, or are we going to see more engaged philanthropy in China among the Chinese?"  And our sense is that the general trend is changing.  I don't think we're going to see anywhere near the 2008 levels this year, but I do think that overall people's minds and sort of experience have been opened up to giving in ways they haven't been before.
Deputy Director, Liu Youping, of the China Charity Information Center, Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA) said that "Donations to charity in the first quarter of [2009] are just a small fraction of what they were in the first quarter of last year -- and that was before the earthquake.  According to Liu Youping, one of the reasons may have been the financial crisis, but another was skepticism about how the earthquake money was spent.  Nevertheless, Liu Youping said that while donations were down in 2009, volunteerism is up.  China's State Council said that 10 million Chinese volunteered in some capacity (earthquake relief and the Olympics) during 2008.

Charles Li, with the Narada Foundation which funds education-related NGOs, said that the foundation has a mission that is to foster civil society in China and to have a strong third sector to make a complete and mature society.  However,
Society may be more open-minded, but the government is still wary about allowing NGOS too much freedom or independence.  After last year's earthquake, there was an unprecedented openness for volunteers, and NGOs formed on the spot.  But, a few weeks later, those new NGOs were told to stop.  If they wanted to keep working, they were told, they had to find a government department to sponsor and supervise them or they couldn't collect donations.
Ming Hu, of the Center on Philanthropy, Indiana University and Purdue University, and Jiangang Zhu, of the Department of Anthropology, Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, China, wrote a paper on "Community Reconstruction after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake: A Reflection on Participatory Development Theories."


Following a three-year case study field research, the authors claimed that "contrary to a single and closed self-recovery, community reconstruction is deeply embedded in and reshaped by a series of much broader social processes: state-dominated post-disaster reconstruction, urban-rural integration development, and social management measures."
We further recognize three major forces constructing those social processes: neo-authoritarian local governments, victims with rising citizenship awareness, and community-based NGOs.  Redefining the power structure in community reconstruction, we argue that, instead of the traditional bottom-up empowerment approach, open communities pluralistic governance, through collaboration of governments, residents, and NGOs, can work more effectively to empower communities and reach sustainable development.
Focusing their research and activities on Baishuihe, a village within Sichuan province, that was destroyed by the earthquake, Hu and Zhu found that residents' self coordination was prone to failure without the presence of Hu and Zhu.

Secondly, principles of transparent decisionmakiing and transparent financial management, which Hu and Zhu had always exemplified and advocated through their community efforts, were not substantially adopted by the Juweihui (or official governing body in every neighborhood or administrative village) and  township government.  Moreover, when national reconstruction policies were declared, local official and Juweihui members significantly reduced their interest and participation in the community activities.

Thirdly, with the victims' gradual return to their everyday lives, and with the start of government-sponsored rebuilding projects, the volunteer stations had become increasingly alienated to residents' major concerned issues because of Hu's and Zhu's status as outsiders.

Fourth, when the earthquake passed the one-year mark, the public's attention and donations gradually declined.  Few came to Baishuihe to volunteer.  NGOs that had launched work stations also decreased commitments and support in the community and returned to their normal operations.

One of the interesting observations by Hu and Zhu was that the emergent relief response to the Sichuan earthquake was likend to a "war" by the state-owned media.  This resulted in the basic characteristics of disaster management policies: centralized decision make by the central government, intensive investment of aid resources, and the mindset of quickly resolving problems.  There was a rumor spread through Baishuihe that the earthquake reconstruction was to be a two-or-three-year thing while the central government payed greater attention and concern.  But since China is so big and the government has so many things on  it agenda, "no one will care about you later if you miss this opportunity (of being sponsored by government)."  Since the victims had no money to independently rebuild their houses and community, many victims finally relented to the great ideological and political pressure to let the government handle things and accepted the government's conditions.

Three major actors were involved in the multiple processes in the Baishuihe reconstruction: the township government, the residents, and the NGOs.  However,
     In all three interwoven social processes, namely the post-earthquake reconstruction, urban-rural integrations, and social stability, the government played a dominant role.  On the one hand, the government actively assumed the responsibilities in resettling the victims, advancing economic growth, and preserving social security; on the other, it ruthlessly pursued the absolute control of public resources by keeping civil society organizations under control.  Two important instruments were employed to undertake the neo-authoritarian policy: planning and marketization.
The state acted as the primary rescuer to deliver relief and assistance when a large number of people lost their most important assets, their homes, in the earthquake.  As a result, victimes experienced complicated feelings, a mix of the collective state view and the market value.  Almost all residential housing and ancillary properties in the quake-stricken area were not insured for earthquake.  So, the majority of victims thanked the state while receiving relief materials.  Some thought the state had the responsibility to help them rebuild their homes, based on the logic that this was a socialist country.

Shortly after the Sichuan earthquake in 2008, NGO researches expected the post-disaster reconstruction to facilitate the growth of civil society in China.  However, after three years, and the three-year study by Ming Hu and Jiangang Zhu, it appears that the NGO sector increased moderately in number, but that the institutional dilemma NGOs had long faced remained, namely registration hindrance, political pressure, public fundraising ban, and human resources bottleneck, and had not significantly improved.

The government's, and specifically, the military's role in the Sichuan earthquake relief effort which could not have been assumed by civil society involved movement of people and traffic and supply chain management.  The Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 32, June 2009 reported that government official reported that within 14 minutes of the earthquake, the central government dispatched the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to the affected areas, and with days, 113,000 soldiers and armed police had been mobilized.  The overall success of the government's response was made possible by its authoritarian position, its experience of managing large population movements and natural disasters, and the rapid deployment of the military.

What we see in China's experience with the Great Sichuan Earthquake has implications for civil society in China.

One is simply the definitional problem with civil society, and especially with respect to the application of certain Western ideas of civil society to the China situation.  This is particularly pertinent to the state-civil society relationship.  An issue that has been present in all of my discussions with both government officials and academics in a number of universities in China is the sense that the registration laws and requirements make it impossible for many NGOs to be properly registered and operating legally and openly.  The MOCA needs to address this issue.

Second, public expectations regarding the state under a socialistic form of governance.  People just believed that the state should supply all their needs and desires.

Third, there is the question of transparency and accountability of NGOs, and the sense that if any monies raised are used for overhead and administrative expenses, that somehow the civil society organization is corrupt.

Fourth, there was little activity by INGOs during the relief and reconstruction efforts required for recovery from the Sichuan earthquake.  While we hear of the Three-Self Patriotic Church movement within religious circles, the principles of self-governance, self-supporting, and self-propagating, seem to be what limits much of the civil society sector to a more local framework in which INGOs and external support is minimized.  Thus, in the case of the Sichuan earthquake, information received from a few active organizations, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, UNICEF, AmeriCares Foundation, and Oxfam-Hong Kong, capture the relatively small-scale activities of these agencies.

Fifth, what seemed to be lacking in Sichuan, was the trained and professional human resources to address all the relief and reconstruction needs of the area following the disaster.  Although there were over 150,000 volunteers, many were not adequately utilized within their skill levels, many were turned away, and many were idle without clear direction.

Sixth, one area overlooked in much of the literature, was the role of the unregistered churches in providing volunteers.  During my public lecture in Shantou University, I was asked the question from a member of the audience whether there was something in the American Judeo-Christian history and ethos that promoted charity and giving to charity that might have been lacking in Chinese history, and particularly recent history.

What I have discovered from interviews and from my reading of reports of volunteers in the Sichuan earthquake relief, rescue, and reconstruction efforts, there were many unregistered church groups, as well as groups from the registered churches that were active as volunteers in Sichuan.  I have already mentioned Amity Foundation which operated with the approval of the Chinese government.  Likewise, Jinde, China's largest state-approved Catholic Charity, was leading an aid effort, especially with volunteers going to remote villages to meet earthquake victims and assess their needs.

The "Love China Movement" was started by house churches after the Sichuan earthquake disaster.  Since 2008, this project has awakened Chinese churches to reach out to their communities and has brought about unity amongst churches.  One pastor and leader of the group said in an interview that "Love China Movement" "has greatly influenced churches . . . [where] the participation of Sichuan earthquake disaster relief and reconstruction project is a great awakening of the Chinese Churches in the area of community services."  The main theme of this project was "Love in Action."

In my blog post on 4 November 2011, I wrote about the work of volunteer organizations in Cambodia and the conflicts over a proposed law to regulate the sector.  http://rvanbroekhoven.blogspot.com/2011/11/power-to-regulate-is-power-to-destroy.html.  The general theories in support of the proposed law were similar to those advanced in support of the proposed legislation in Russia.

There is a somewhat similar dynamic going on in the United States during the past year.  Although most of the focus has been on religious freedom, and more specifically, the recognition of religious freedom as a first principle in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the power of the national government to regulate in such a way that this freedom of believe and practice is limited by the exercise of government power, the issue really addresses the basic issue in this post, namely the external threat to civil society.

The issue here arises out of Affordable Care Act, and more specifically, the regulations that have been proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services.  As originally issued over a year ago, the statute and regulations required all employers to provide contraceptive services to all women without charge to the women.

In the first announced proposal, churches and their directly related groups, such as denominations and religious orders, were exempt provided that they had religious objections to providing contraceptive services.  However, the definition of church and their directly related groups included only those that "have the inculcation of religious values as [their] purpose" and that primarily served and employed people who share the group's religious beliefs.

Under the revised rule, primarily as an accommodation to the Roman Catholic Church and similarly situated religious institutions, and according to a statement issued my the Department of Health and Human Services, "A house of worship would not be excluded from the exemption because, for example, it provides charitable social services to persons of different religious faiths or employees of different religious faiths."  Moreover, the Obama administration announced a year ago, again as an accommodation to Roman Catholic and other religious charities, that such groups would not have to "contract, arrange, or pay or refer for any contraceptive coverage to which they object on religious grounds."  But, the employees covered such organizations' healthcare plan would still receive the separate coverage through whatever healthcare the employer used.

Thus, under the new rules, all employers with the exception of houses of worship have to pay, or make available through an outside insurer, contractive coverage as part of their insurance plans, including the so-called, "morning-after pill," sterilizations and other treatments to which the Roman Catholic Church and many evangelical and religious groups object.

Cardinal Timothy Dolan of New York and president of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, in a statement issued on 7 February 2013, listed three key areas of concern: the narrow understanding of a religious ministry; compelling church ministries to fund and facilitate services, such as contraceptives, including abortion-inducing drugs and sterilization that violate Catholic teaching; and disregard of the conscience rights of for-profit business owners who operate their businesses according to their faith and moral values.

Religiously affiliated charities and schools objected to these regulations, as have some devout religious business owners, such as religious bookstores and publishing companies, such as Tyndale House Publishers, and for-profit companies, such as Hobby Lobby.  More than 40 challenges are working their way through the courts, basically arguing that the mandate violates their religious freedoms under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the rights under the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

While my own perspective is that the mandate violates the First Amendment Freedom of Religion clause to the U.S. Constitution, and violates both the letter and spirit of the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act, there has been no court in the United States that has specifically ruled on the merits of those claims.  However, there is a split in the circuits with respect to the rulings on the procedural and jurisdictional issues.

My point here, as it was on a different point in my post, The Power to Regulate is the Power to Destroy, and my posts, Alexis de Tocqueville and Civil Society (1 November 2009) and Government, Civil Society, and Public Benefit (22 November 2009), is that through regulation and law, governments can either destroy or significantly and adversely affect the nonprofit public benefit sector.

As I wrote in my post of 22 November 2009:
There was a recent situation in Washington, D.C. that illustrates the problems posed by these questions.  For many years, Catholic Charities, a religious charitable organization, had received both government grants and contracts from the government of Washington, D.C.  At issue was $18-20 million in city funds for 20 to 25 programs run by Catholic Charities.  A medical clinic in the Spanish Catholic Center served 3000 people.  This clini received approximately 60 percent of its budget from the city.  Another program provided tutoring services for people preparing to take general education development (GED) tests received 35 percent of its budget from the city.  Foster care and adoption placement services received 90 percent of its funding from the city.  In addition to these services, Catholic Charities received funds from the city to offer mental health services, to operate nine homeless shelters, and during winter, to run hyperthermia shelters.
The conflict between the city of Washington, D.C. and Catholic Charities, and indeed, between the city and the Catholic Archdiocese of Washington arose when the city government proposed changes in the city laws to provide a same-sex marriage law.  Under this proposed law, religious organizations, including the churches, would not be required to perform or make space available for same-sex marriages.  
Cardinal Donald Wuerl, the Archbishop of Washington, writing in the Washington Post on 22 January 2013, noted that the Roman Catholic Church has long been criticized as being too dogmatic; that demands have been made that it change its 2000-year-old history and teachings on marriage, family, sexuality, morality, and other matters relating to truth about human beings.  "But even if others do not agree, the church understands that what it proclaims is revealed truth -- the Word of God."

Cardinal Wuerl then went out to point out that the Archdiocese of Washington is the largest nongovernmental provider of social services in our area.  Seventy-five programs in 48 locations offer assistance to whoever needs it, regardless of religion, race, gender, nationality, or sexual orientation.  He went on to say that "[e]ach year, more than 100,000 people in the Washington area rely on Catholic charitable organizations for housing, food, job training, immigration assistance, legal aid, dental care, mental health, lifespan services for those with disabilities and their families and prenatal cared and assistance for the vulnerable pregnant women and unwed mothers."

The Bread of Life Mission, which has served the homeless community in Pioneer Square, Seattle, Washington for over 70 years, was directed by the city to stop feeding the hungry in downtown parks.  According to David Takami with the Seattle Human Services Department, the city does not allow groups of people to feed the homeless outdoors without city approval.

David Takami said that those wishing to feed the homeless needed to coordinate their activities with the Operation: Sack Lunch Program, which serves up to 300 people a day at the city's outdoor meal site located under the I-5 bridge at 6th Avenue and Columbus Street.  By requiring all food served at the site to be coordinated this way, the city can control the nutritional value of what the homeless people eat and can prevent litter from being left behind at parks after meals, according to Mr. Takami.

While Bread of Life Mission is upset about these restrictions, it hopes to continue serving meals to homeles people who come to its shelter.

So, now what should we make of all of this?  Just this week, on 11 February 2013, the new Secretary General of CIVICUS, Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, began his "mandate at head of the global alliance" with his reflections on the role of CIVICUS in particular, and global civil society in general with respect to all of the challenges affecting citizens around the world.

There are, it seems to me, two hints at what he is thinking when he speaks of protecting civil society space and promoting citizen participation.   As he said, civil society was "screaming about big problems -- from financial meltdown to climate crisis -- long before governments and business woke up."  His aim is to aim is to "amplify those voices, especially from the global South, which are coming up with novel ways of promoting citizen voice and innovative ways of fighting injustice."  What he does not identify is the nature of the civil space for which he advocated the protection.

Since the terms, civil society organizations, third sector, public benefit organizations, voluntary associations, and charities are often used interchangeably, the problem is more a mater of research discipline, such as sociology, political science, law, political philosophy, and economics.  As the London School of Economics, Centre for Civil Society defined it,
Civil society refers to the  arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes, and values.  Its institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family, and market, though in practice, civil society, family, and markets are often complex, blurred, and negotiated.
Historically, CSOs were thought of as mediating organizations, voluntary in nature, between the individual and government.

 As I wrote in http://rvanbroekhoven.blogspot.com/2011/11/power-to-regulate-is-power-to-destroy.html on 4 November 2011, much of the dispute between civil society and the Cambodian government over the proposed new law on NGOs related to questions of by human rights and advocacy organizations, primarily INGOs.  Indeed, as I wrote:
While these INGO signatories stated that civil society actors, both local and foreign, play a vital role in the growth in commerce and industry "through monitoring, community development, poverty alleviation, humanitarianism, research, and advocacy," the draft law would threaten "to severely restrict civil society's freedom of association and expression, thereby preventing civil society organizations and NGOs from fulfilling these roles."  "Efforts to ensure transparency and accountability in project implementation will also likely be negatively affected as civil society groups monitor government projects face tighter, and potentially hostile government scrutiny."
But, hostile government actions, including legislation, orders, and enforcement practices, are frequently the result of disputes with what the government perceives to be hostile advocacy groups.  And clearly, as Secretary General Sriskandarajah said,
Vested interests are hard to fight.  And in the established democracies, policymakers seem to be coming up with ever-cleaver ways of keeping civil society in check.  Politicians' paranoia is also hard to fight the world over!
He goes on to argue that new technologies mean that people can not only mobilize more effectively, but also monitor and hold governments accountable. According to Sriskandarfajah, global solidarity holds the key and that we need to share our experiences and lessons learned across civil society and use our collective voices in support of common causes.

While I am not persuaded that this is an adequate and complete definition of civil society, it is clearly a part of the civil society agenda that keeps both democratic societies and nondemocratic societies on edge in terms of their respect for the role of civil society.  It also reflects the definitional differences between some of the thinking in the West and emerging civil society movement in the East.

Bans may exist in some countries which are focused on human rights and political advocacy organizations, and registration and tax laws may make it difficult for some of these groups to operate in a country, especially if they are INGOs.  But, this is only part of the story.

Rather than think of civil society in only political terms, for the purpose of this discussion, I would simply adopt a definition which recognizes the political, sociological, economic, legal construct of the concept.

My guess is that rather than simply ban all civil society organizations, most countries, democratic or otherwise, may seek to restrict the authority and operations of CSOs, including purely charitable organizations, and especially INGOs, on the theory that such organizations and people involved in them are a threat to the power of the state.  In socialist countries with histories of government control of all aspects of life, populations are left with the idea that the government should provide for all of its citizens and suspicious of volunteer organizations.  This was part of the story illustrated above with respect to the volunteer efforts in Russia and the relief and reconstruction work in China following the Great Sichuan Earthquake.

Another closely related factor in possible government hostility to civil society and in suspicions of a country's citizen, is the idea that backers of laws and proposed laws regulating volunteer activity want to ensure that volunteer activity conform to the government's policies, priorities, and that it not conflict with state policies.  This is illustrated by the cases, Volunteers on Wheels and Liza Alert in Russia, and some of the many groups providing relief and reconstruction volunteer service in Sichuan Province, China.

Closely related to these factors is the case in which the government seeks to impose its value set on society generally, and thereby indirectly restrict the work of charitable organizations with value sets that are different than those of the government. Thus, in the U.S., when the government promotes certain women's rights, such as contraceptive service at no expense to the employee, or same sex rights, including same sex marriage, religious organizations are unable to provide the charitable services that they have provided for decades and perhaps centuries consistent with their belief systems, teaching and their rights to religious freedom.

Outright bans, selective and complex registration requirements, exercise of power through authoritative actions, tax policy, and imposition of certain value sets are some of the ways the state can restrict the activities and effectiveness of charitable organizations.  Perhaps, most states, if not all states, feel threatened by forces that they cannot control and are wary about allowing NGOs, like market organizations, too much freedom or independence.

This leads to some questions about law and the nature of law, which were addressed by Lord Patrick Devlin, a British lawyer, judge, and Lord Justice of the Court of Appeal, in his book, The Enforcement of Morals.  He raised three basic questions that seem to me to have pertinence to the relationship between the state and civil society.  I raise a final question.  The questions are these:
1.  The first is: Does society have the right to pass judgments at all on matters of morality?  Ought there, in other words, be a public morality, or are morals always a question for private judgment?
2.  The second is:  If society has the right to pass such judgment, has it the right to use the weapon of law to enforce it?
3.  Third:  If society has the right to use the weapon of law to enforce its judgment on morals, ought it to use that weapon in all cases or only in some?  And, if only in some, on what principle should it be enforced by law and what judgments should not?
4.  These three questions raise basic questions about the subject matter, namely moral knowledge is knowledge about what?  Once that is decided, we are faced with the epistemological question: How is moral knowledge achieved?  And then we must face the motivational question: What reason, if any, should one take to have an interest in, or care about moral knowledge.  
These might give some conceptual frame work to questions regarding the existence and role of civil society, and then how civil society organizations should relate to the state and society generally, and how the state might regulate the sector.